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1. Introduction
Recent investigations have uncovered large, consistent deviations from the predictions of the textbook representation
of Homo economicus (Roth et al, 1992, Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Camerer 2001).  One problem appears to lie in
economists’ canonical assumption that individuals are entirely self-interested: in addition to their own material payoffs,
many experimental subjects appear to care about fairness and reciprocity, are willing to change the distribution of material
outcomes at personal cost, and reward those who act in a cooperative manner while punishing those who do not even
when these actions are costly to the individual.  These deviations from what we will term the canonical model have
important consequences for a wide range of economic phenomena, including the optimal design of institutions and
contracts, the allocation of property rights, the conditions for successful collective action, the analysis of incomplete
contracts, and the persistence of noncompetitive wage premia.
  Fundamental questions remain unanswered. Are the deviations from the canonical model evidence of
universal patterns of behavior, or do the individual’s economic and social environments shape behavior? If the latter,
which economic and social conditions are involved? Is reciprocal behavior better explained statistically by individuals’
attributes such as their sex, age, or relative wealth, or by the attributes of the group to which the individuals belong?  Are
there cultures that approximate the canonical account of self-regarding behavior?
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Existing research cannot answer such questions because virtually all subjects have been university students, and
while there are cultural differences among student populations throughout the world, these differences are small
compared to the range of all social and cultural environments.  To address the above questions, we and our collaborators
undertook a large cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public good, and dictator games. Twelve experienced
field researchers, working in twelve countries on four continents, recruited subjects from fifteen small-scale societies
2exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. Our sample consists of three foraging societies, six who
p0ractice slash-and-burn horticultural, four nomadic herding groups and three sedentary, small-scale agriculturalists. Our
results are described in detail, with extensive ethnographic accounts of the cultures we studied, and citations to the
relevant literature  in Henrich, et al, 2001; an extended overview paper is available at  www.santafe.edu.
We can summarize our results as follows.  First, the canonical model is not supported in any society studied.
Second, there is considerably more behavioral variability across groups than had been found in previous cross-cultural
research and the canonical model fails in a wider variety of ways than in previous experiments. Third, group-level
differences in economic organization and the degree of market integration explain a substantial portion of the behavioral
variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation, the
greater the level of cooperation in experimental games. Fourth, behavior in the experiments is generally consistent with
economic patterns of everyday life in these societies.
2. The Evidence
Because the ultimatum game (UG) has conducted throughout the world with student populations and has
generated robust violations of the canonical model, we conducted this game in all of our seventeen societies. The
“proposer” in this game is provisionally assigned an amount equivalent to a day or two’s wages in the society and asked
to propose an offer to a second person, the “respondent.”  The respondent may then either accept the offer, in which
case the two players receive the proposed amounts, or reject it, in which case the two receive nothing.  If both players
conform to the canonical model and if this is common knowledge, it is easy to see that the proposer will know that the
respondent will accept any positive offer, and so will offer the smallest possible amount, which will be accepted.
In most of our of our field experiments subjects played anonymously, not knowing the identity of the person or
persons with whom they were paired.   The stakes of most games were denominated in money (though in some cases
tobacco or other goods were used). In all cases we tested prospective participants for their comprehension of the
experiment, and eliminated any who appeared not to grasp the game.
The systematic deviations from the canonical model in our sample of simple societies can be inferred from Table
1, which lists all groups where UGs   were conducted. Contrary to the prediction of the standard model, even the groups
with the smallest offers have mean offers over 25 percent of stake size.  Illustrating our second result -- the large variation
in mean offers across societies-- others, including the Torguud and the Mapuche, offered between 30 and 40 percent,
while still others, including the Achuar and the Sangu, offered between 40 and 50 percent. Finally, the Aché and the
Lamelara had mean offers greater than 50 percent.
3]Group Country Mean
Offer
Modes
(% of sample)
Rejection
Rate
Rejections
 20% of pot
Machiguenga Peru 0.26 0.15/0.25 (72%) 1/21 1/10
Hadza (Small Camp) Tanzania 0.27 0.20 (38%) 8/29 5/16
Tsimané Bolivia 0.37 0.5/0.3/0.25 (65%) 0/70 0/5
Quichua Ecuador 0.27 0.25 (47%) 2/13 1/2
Hadza (all camps) Tanzania 0.33 0.20/0.50 (47%) 13/55 9/21
Torguud Mongolia 0.35 0.25 (30%) 1/20 0/1
Khazax Mongolia 0.36 0.25
Mapuche Chile 0.34 0.50/0.33 (46%) 2/30 2/10
Au PNG 0.43 0.3 (33%) 8/30 1/1
Gnau PNG 0.38 0.4 (32%) 10/25 3/6
Hadza (Big Camp) Tanzania 0.40 0.50 (28%) 5/26 4/5
Sangu (farmers) Tanzania 0.41 0.50 (35%) 5/20 1/1
Unresettled Zimbabwe 0.41 0.50 (56%) 3/31 2/5
Achuar Ecuador 0.42 0.50 (36%) 0/16 0/1
Sangu (herders) Tanzania 0.42 0.50 (40%) 1/20 1/1
Orma Kenya 0.44 0.50 (54%) 2/56 0/0
Resettled Zimbabwe 0.45 0.50 (70%) 12/86 4/7
Ache Paraguay 0.51 0.50/0.40 (75%) 0/5 0/8
Lamelara Indonesia 0.58 0.50 (63%) 0/2 0.37
Table 1. The ultimatum same in small scale societies. . Column 3 shows the mean offer (%) in the UG for each
society and column 4 shows the modal offer(s) together with the percentage of subjects (in parentheses) who make
modal offers.
These group differences are strikingly large compared to previous cross-cultural work comparing ultimatum game
behavior among university students (Roth et. al. 1991). While mean offers in industrial societies are typically close to
44%, the mean offers in our sample range from 26% to 58%. Similarly, while modal offers are consistently 50% in
industrialized societies, our sample modes vary from 15% to 50%.
As shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1, rejections are also much more variable than previously observed.
While in industrial societies offers below 20 percent are rejected with probability .40 to .60, rejections of low offers
are extremely rare among some groups. In other groups, however, we observe substantial rejections rates, including
frequent rejections of offers above 50%. Among the Achuar, Aché and Tsimané, we observe zero rejections after 16,
51 and 70 proposer offers, respectively. Moreover, while the Aché and Achuar made fairly equitable offers, nearly
50% of Tsimané offers were at or below 30%, yet all were accepted. Similarly, Machiguenga responders rejected only
one offer, despite the fact that over 75% of their offers were below 30%. At the other end of the rejection scale,
4Hadza responders rejected 24% of all proposer offers and 43% of offers at 20% and below. Unlike the Hadza, who
preferentially rejected low offers, the Au and Gnau of Papua New Guinea rejected both unfair and hyper-fair (greater
than 50%) offers with nearly equal frequency.
In experiments with university subjects, offers are generally consistent with income-maximization, given the
distribution of rejections. In our sample, however, in the majority of groups the modal behavior of the proposers is
not consistent with expected income maximization. In the Tsimané and Aché cases, for instance, there are no
rejections of offers below 20 percent, although there were several low offers. The rejection rate for all other offers is
also zero. Yet the modal offer in both groups is 50 percent and the average offer is 37 and 51 percent, respectively.
Where possible we used the relationship between the size of offer and the fraction of rejections to estimate
 income-maximizing offers for the group in question.  In one group, the Hadza proposers approximated the income-
maximizing offer quite closely, thus confirming the canonical model; but Hadza responders frequently rejected
substantial positive offers, thus violating the canonical model. In all other groups average offers exceeded the
income-maximizing offer, in most cases by a substantial amount.
Data from public goods games played in seven of these societies also show much greater variation than
previously found, and again they exhibit novel deviations from the predictions of the canonical model. Public goods
games ask subjects to contribute to a common pool that will be expanded by the experimenter and then redistributed
to all subjects. The canonical prediction is that everyone will free ride, contributing nothing.  Typical distributions of
public goods game contributions with students have a U-shape with the mode at contributing nothing, a secondary
mode at full cooperation, and mean contribution between 40% and 60%. By contrast, for instance, the Machiguenga
have a mode at contributing nothing, with not a single subject cooperating fully, yielding a mean contribution of
22%. Also, the Aché and Tsimané both exhibit inverted distributions with few or no contributions at full free-riding
and full cooperation.
In three dictator games played in three of these societies, groups also deviate both from typical behavior in
industrialized societies and the canonical predictions.  The dictator game allows the proposer to simply assign some
fraction of the stake to a passive second party who receives that amount. Among university students, the distribution
of “offers” in the dictator game typically has a mode at zero and a secondary mode at 50/50, while the canonical
model predicts people will give zero. Contrasting with both, the Orma have a mode at 50% and a secondary mode at
20%. Hadza dictators show a mode at 10%. Offers of 0% and 50% are also popular. Among the Tsimané, there were
no zero offers, the mean was 32%, and the mode was 25%.
3. What explains group-level differences?
The large variations across the different cultural groups suggest that preferences and/or expectations are
affected by group-specific conditions, such as social institutions, or cultural fairness norms. The large variance in
institutions and norms in our sample allowed us to address this question systematically. Because of space limits we
here concentrate on the behavior of proposers in the UG. We rank-ordered the societies along two dimensions. 1)
5Payoffs to cooperation (PC) - how important and how large are a group’s payoff from cooperation in economic
production? And  2) Market integration (MI) - how much do people rely on market exchange in their daily lives? 
On the dimension payoffs to cooperation, the Machiguenga and Tsimané rank the lowest; they are almost
entirely economically independent at the family level and engage rarely in productive activities involving more than
members of a family.  By contrast, the Lamelara whale-hunters go to sea in large canoes manned by a dozen or more.
The rationale for PC as a predictor of UG-offers is that with little cooperative production there will be little necessity
to share returns while those whose livelihood depends on large-scale cooperation like the Lamelara must develop
ways of sharing the joint surplus. Thus we might expect that a higher level of PC will increase sharing behavior in the
UG.  The rationale for market integration (MI) as an explanatory variable is that the more frequently people
experience market transactions, the more they will also experience abstract sharing principles concerning behaviors
towards strangers of which the UG is an example.
 We sought to explain group mean UG offers on the basis of these two dimensions of economic structure. In
a regression, both PC and MI were highly significant, their (positive) normalized regression coefficients were large in
magnitude (about 0.3), and the two measures jointly explained 68 percent of the variance. The impact of PC and MI
remains large and robust in an equation predicting individual offers, including individual measures such as sex, age,
relative wealth, village population size,  stake size, and experimenter experience with the group.  Surprisingly, none
of these individual level measures was significantly related to offers.
 A plausible interpretation of our subjects’ behaviors is that when faced with a novel situation (the
experiment) they looked for analogues in their daily experience, asking “what familiar situation is this game like?”
and then acting in a way appropriate for the analogous situation. For instance, the hyper-fair UG offers (greater than
50 percent) and the frequent rejections of these offers among the Au and Gnau reflects the culture of gift-giving
found in these societies. Among these groups, like many in New Guinea, accepting gifts, even unsolicited ones,
commits one to reciprocate at some future time to be determined by the giver. Receipt of large gifts also establishes
one in a subordinate position. Consequently, excessively large gifts, especially unsolicited ones, will frequently be
refused because of the anxiety about the unspecific strings attached. Similarly the low offers and high rejection rates
of the Hadza appear to reflect their reluctant process of sharing (termed “tolerated theft” by a leading ethnographer
of the Hadza). While the Hadza extensively share meat, many hunters look for opportunities to avoid sharing and
share only because they fear the social consequences of not sharing, in the form of informal social sanctions, gossip
and ostracism. This behavior is apparently transferred to the experimental setting.
Unlike the Hadza, the Aché did not reject low offers and despite this the vast majority of the Aché (94
percent) made offers above 40 percent of the stake size. This coincides neatly with ethnographic descriptions
indicating widespread meat sharing and cooperation in community projects despite the absence of a fear of
punishment in Aché society.  Ache hunters, returning home, quietly leave their kill at the edge of camp, often
claiming that the hunt was fruitless; their catch is later discovered and collected by others and then meticulously
shared among all in the camp.  We think it likely that the stake in the game seemed to some of the Ache subjects as
analogous to their catch.
6The Machiguenga show the lowest cooperation rates in public good games, reflecting ethnographic
descriptions of Machiguenga life, which report little cooperation, exchange, or sharing beyond the family unit.  By
contrast, Orma experimental subjects quickly dubbed the public goods experiment a harambee game, referring to the
widespread institution of village-level voluntary contributions for public goods projects such as schools or roads. Not
surprisingly, they contributed generously (58 percent of the stake), somewhat higher than most U.S. subjects
contributions in similar experiments.
4. Discussion
Our data indicate that the degree of cooperation, sharing, and punishment exhibited by experimental subjects closely corresponds
to templates for these behaviors in the subjects’ daily life; and the substantial variability in experimental behaviors across groups
is an expression of the large between-group differences in the structures of social interaction and modes of livelihood.  How do we
interpret these results?
Some of the variability among groups may be due to variations in implementation.  We doubt that this explains
the markedly differing behaviors across groups, however, since the experiments were run from identical protocols across
groups and were thus as similar in procedures and stake size as we could achieve.  Where we could test for experimenter
effects we found none.  It is possible also that our subjects presumed that their actions would somehow become public.
 In a good many of our cases, however, subsequent conversations with participants convinced us that this was not the
case. Finally, it could be that participants thought they were in a repeated interaction, even though the games we used
were clearly one-shot.  We do not find this interpretation compelling; however, since there is extensive evidence from
experiments in advanced economies that subjects understand the game very well and those who reject a positive offer
in the ultimatum game, when interviewed by the experimenter, typically do not say that they made an error, but rather
affirm having goals besides maximizing a monetary payoff.
Why are many subjects willing to share resources and undertake costly reciprocal actions in anonymous one-
shot interactions? Bowles, Boyd, Fehr, and Gintis (2002) provide a more extensive response than can be offered here.
 A proximate reason for these behaviors we suspect is that  situations cue emotional responses which induce the behaviors
we have measured. For example, many ultimatum game responders from advanced societies when facing a low offer
experience an emotional impulse to hurt the proposer for being unfair, just as the subject might in a real-life bargaining
situation.  Similarly, the New Guinea responders who rejected hyper-fair offers in the UG may have experienced the same
anxiety that emerges when somebody gives them an unsolicited gift in everyday life.
What are the ultimate determinants of our emotions and situation-specific cues? Here long-run evolutionary
processes governing the distribution of genes and cultural practices could well have resulted in a substantial fraction of
each population being predisposed in certain situations to forego material payoffs in order to share with others, or to
punish unfair actions, as our experimental subjects did.  A number of recent contributions have shown that under
conditions that appear to approximate the social and physical environments of early human populations,  prosocial
behavior can then proliferate in a population in which it is initially rare.(Bowles, Boyd, Fehr, Gintis 2000).
75. Conclusion
While our results do not suggest that economists should abandon the rational actor framework they do have two major
 revisions.  First, the canonical model of the self-interested material payoff-maximizing actor is systematically violated.
In all societies studied, UG offers are strictly positive and often substantially in excess of the  expected income maximizing
offer, as are contributions in the PG game, while rejections of positive offers in some societies occur at a considerable rate.
Second, preferences over economic choices are not exogenous as the canonical model would have it, but rather are
shaped by the economic and social interactions of everyday life. This result implies that judgments in welfare economics
that assume exogenous preferences are questionable, as are predictions of the  effects of changing economic  policies  and
institutions that  fail to take account of behavioral change. Finally, the connection between experimental behavior and
the structure of everyday economic life should provide an important clue in revising the canonical model of individual
choice behavior.
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